

The Complexity of Intra-Afghan Dialogue Civil War Looms in Afghanistan

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Abstract

The US and NATO through a peace deal got a safe exit from Afghanistan. In this backdrop, the economic future of Afghanistan is more important. On the other hand, Pakistan has a short period to format its policies because after the US withdraws, there are serious threats of civil war and chaos in Afghanistan. India, Pakistan, Russia, and China are the rival states in the regions, which have strategic interests in Afghanistan. Regional, religious, ethnic, political, social, and economic complexities are the major obstacles to the Intra-Afghan peace deal. All these factors are indicating more complexes in the intra-Afghan peace process, which may lead to civil war. The possible solutions are the traditional Pashtuns Loya Jirga. This work attempts to analyze the stakeholders and trends in the Intra-Afghan peace process, and the complexities of the peace process.

Keywords: Civil War, Peace Deal, NATO, Loya Jirga, Shura, Tribal system, Taliban

Introduction

Naturally and geographically Afghanistan is a land lock country, located almost in the center of Asia. Afghanistan shares a south and east border with Pakistan. Since the Taliban attack on the United State on 11th September 2001, NATO is engaged in Afghanistan to prevent it, to not become again a safe zone for terrorist, following the United Nations agenda of peace. This WOT is a history of almost nineteen years. The US Central Command Combined Air Operations Center provided data claiming that the US dropped 7,423 bombs in Afghanistan. These are the largest usage of bombs in the last ten years. The peace agreement resumed again and both the parties were agreed on a few basic points, the Taliban guaranteed that the land of Afghanistan will not be provided to any terrorist organization as shelter, the US bow his shoulders on complete withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the most important was the ceasefire and a guarantee of peaceful

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Intra-Afghan peace deal. The US tried its best to compel the Taliban to talk to the democratic government of Afghanistan but the Taliban refused to accept the puppet regime. They termed them as west back puppet administration. Instead of all these complexities, a meeting was held in Doha in July 2019, in which members of government, politicians, members of civil societies, and women met the Taliban to process the Intra-Afghan Peace process. On February 29, Taliban, US, and Afghan security forces signed an agreement in Doha, named “RIV”, Reduction in violence.

This agreement was a hope to end the long-running war in Afghanistan. The joint session said that the withdrawal of US troops is not the end of the war in Afghanistan and this withdrawal cannot guarantee a complete peace on the land. The actual problem is the transformation of powers and the political system. The war may be continued between the Taliban and other groups. So it is very important to observe the complexities of Afghan issues. The Intra-Afghan process is more complicated than the US- Taliban peace deal. The internal factors and actors have to decide the future of Afghanistan in the absence of foreign troops. The main question arose in the minds and the research work of scholars is very valid that “will the peace agreement bring peace and stability to the soil of Afghanistan”? This all depends on the actors, process, and complexities of the Intra-Afghan peace procedure. The initial agreement may be the basic road to peace but not lead to the destination. Still, documents signed in Doha failed to specify the procedure and schedule for the Intra-Afghan peace process. The details are missed and ignored by the two major groups. This question is looking still fiction.

Although a large number of the public is supporting the process still few basic problems are not addressed well like sharing power, disarming and reintegrating Taliban fighters into society, and determining the future of the country’s democratic institutions and constitutional amendments. Iran and Pakistan stated that they are strongly in favor of a peaceful and stable Afghanistan (jamal, March 31, 2020). The famous Taliban leader and diplomat, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaheef make clear to Independent Urdu that they still very strong ideology and stance of the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’.

Ghani calculated dimensions wrong and took other politicians and opinion-makers very lightly. He took the peace process very lightly. He has done this willingly by planning strategies to sideline all other people and capture the central political and democratic power. That's why the intra-afghan peace process has the worst start. There are equal chances of success and failure depending upon the willingness and aims of the participants and groups. The procedure will decide the future of Afghanistan. The sincerity of the groups can make sure the peace in future. The prosperity and stability are now dependable on a few stakeholders. They have to decide the fate of the entire nation. In reality, the intra-Afghan peace process is more complicated than the US-Taliban peace deal, more factors and actors are involved in this process, having different agendas and ideologies.

The Taliban's statement of entering into the Peace process with the public instead of politicians and a democratic government is very dangerous and controversial by nature; other militant and political groups will never accept the Taliban with such an agenda. The fear like in 1992 still exists, that Taliban may repeat that episode of the history.

Challenges to Peace Process

Although a large population of civilian is supporting the peace process but still many problems are there on the road to peace like power sharing, disarming and again integrating of militants into a peaceful society and deciding the future democratic system and constitutional status of the state. The table talk has already a fearful start started from the US-Taliban peace in February. Afghan government refused to the peace deal between US and Taliban regarding the release of five thousand Taliban prisoners, who are in Afghan jails in exchange for one thousand Afghan security soldiers, which are in Taliban's prison, said that they had not any such deal with Taliban. This statement is affecting the Intra-Afghan peace deal badly.

The process is more complicated because of the weak democratic government, consists of different ethnic, sectarian, and tribal groups. The 2019 general is a solid proof of complexity of the society, where only 1.8 million voters out of 9 million cast their votes while on the other hands attacks were made on polling stations, hundreds were killed and results were announced after months. In

result Ashraf Ghani got success and took the oath of president, in reaction his competitor Abdullah Abdullah, rejected the results and claimed that he is the president and formed his own governments, in a single state two governments were formed.

Experts on Afghan politics and issues are saying that now Taliban are at the strongest position of their life Spain. They are not such strong in the last eighteen years where they are now having more power and influence. Estimates are made that now they have about sixty thousand militants, they have a strong hold and control in the major districts and also attacking continuously on security forces with more modern techniques and weapons of mass destruction. At recent they are also stronger economically as they had earned millions of dollars from the cultivation of drugs especially of opium poppy. The drug trade under their control is creating more problems and obstacles for peace deal. Rank-and-file Taliban fighters will not digest a peaceful society; experts are also worried about this mind set.

Intra-Afghan Peace Dialogues

Taliban started peace deal with USA in March 2020. In all the process, Taliban refused just to one point and that is a direct talk with the Afghan Government, they termed it as a puppet regime. Recently, Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is the Deputy Taliban leader, wrote in New York Times “if we have the capability to sign a peace deal with a foreign aggressor than obviously we will resolve the problems within the state too through negotiations”. This statement is looking very positive towards Intra-Afghan peace deal. (Maizland, March 2, 2020).

The Intra-Afghan peace negotiations were supposed to be held in Doha on Saturday, 12th September. Before that the plan was to start the talk in March soon after the US-Taliban peace deal on 29th February. The first step is a landmark but the second phase of peace process is still have no start which is making the case ambiguous. The release of prisoner and the commitments of cease fire delayed the process till today. The cease fire agreement is seem to be failed in the light of recent deadly attacks in Afghanistan. The attacks done by the Taliban on Afghan security forces are the techniques to insert enough pressure on Ashraf Ghani to

bow his head. The Taliban are in contact with US peace team through their office in Doha. Both the parties doesn't engaged the afghan government in the peace process but US made it very clear that Taliban have to start peace deal with Kabul too, soon after the peace deal with US.

There are two points very clear that Taliban have upper hand in peace deal in Doha, they do not agree to set for any negotiation with Ashraf Ghani while the Kabul have a stance that they have the final Authority to decide peace deal as they are the representatives of the public of Afghan soil. These two mind sets and ideologies of gaining political power can through the state into civil war again. At the end the main question raised by the International political experts is, will the Kabul have the capacity to force Taliban to work in the democratic set up?

Social and Cultural Complexity

The nature of afghan society is "Tribalism", in which individuals have no authority to make decisions at any position they have, the entire tribe have to make decision. The authority which is responsible for the decision making is called "Shura", it the oldest and largely practicing form of democracy in Afghanistan and in Pashtun belt from centuries. That single team of representatives usually responsible to take decisions and resolve the issues. The final agreements need the approval of Shura. Shura is also responsible for internal and external conflicts resolution of the tribe. Without the involvement of these Shuras in peace deal, it is not possible. The nature of decision making of these tribal leaders should be understood. Here the biggest challenge for Intra-Afghan peace deal is the tribal system, the question is very to be answered that "is it possible to bring all these social customs on a single page"?

The biggest problem is the self-identity of the large inhabitants of Afghanistan. The identity came from complex self-developing system with a libertinism construction; this basic unit is very problematic. Natural and geographical environment, social structure of the society, political factors, the historically established features of economy and culture are the factors influencing the development of the social identity structure of the Afghan society i.e. Pashtun, Tajik and Uzbek are described within these historical structures. The most important point is to realize and understand the characteristics and mind set up of

the different elements. By comparing all these to each other on the bases of cultivated values and behavior stereotypes. There are hundreds of factors came from historical background and culture that influence the formation of the Afghan society. The arguments are enough to justify that the soil carries much rich and historical cultures and identities (Ladygina, January 2018).

This Tribal system was one of the main causes of civil wars in the past. The social norms and customs are more holy for the tribes than of their lives. They were and they are not agreeing at any value to sacrifices their social values. Most of the population is Pashtun, who are very raged in their traditional identity. Pashtun have a logic that first of all we are Pashtuns than we are Muslims.

Political Complexity

Ghani was looking very positive and taking very bold steps to bring peace and stability to the state. His vision is remarkable to bring the state on the roads of prosperity. In the peace process the Taliban are seem to be more dominant in the future. Their narrative is observing more powerful. They have the authority to whom they are willingly to talk and what to talk. Taliban always insisted on direct talk to US and not accepting Kabul as a party and authority in the peace deal. These political dilemmas are fatal and can affect the peace deal badly.

If we characterize the Afghanistan in the mirror of modernization and definition of democracy than it is clear from the historical and practical evidences that the recent regime is failed to control across the large area, practicing power is absent in the state, while the entire system is going through anarchy. Politics and power are in the hands of ethnic groups and tribal leaders while the machinery of state is nowhere. These lines of linguistic and ethnic uses of power are enough to destabilize the regime. The exploitations are at top of the history now a day. The same observed during the Taliban regime in 2001, the institutions and administration failed to deliver services, good governess and develop sociopolitical status. The current situations are the repetition of the past (Kaura, APR 26 2018). The biggest challenge is the political structure and transition of powers in this process. The parties are not still clear what will be the political system of Afghanistan, after US withdrawal, Taliban are seeing more interested in Islamic system while the other political parties are struggling for a democratic system.

Economic Complexity

According to the economic complex index (ECI), Afghanistan was at 115 in the world economy, these calculations were in terms of GDP growth in 2018 calculations. It was at 141 in total exports list and was at 103 in import list. On the other it was also in the list of most complex economy at number 103. The total exports of Afghanistan in 2018 were \$1.27B while imports were about \$10B, which cause a loss of negative trade of -\$8.74B. If we talk about per capita exports and imports than that was about \$34.2 and \$269 respectively (Strengthening Trade and Economic Ties between). There is no attention to economic growth, the poverty raised more. They have a sluggish economy and the lack of investments and economic satisfaction can lead any peace deal to be unsuccessful. This can create obstacles on the road of peace. Countering economic crises will not only create favorable circumstances for the upcoming peace deal but will also attract foreign investors and donors for reconstruction and rehabilitation after peace deal (Sabit, September 05, 2019).

It is almost the third generation of Afghanistan in war. All the militants are not fighting for religious cause; many of them have economic motives and benefits. Most of them don't have any other profession to run their livelihood. War is a business for elites. On the other hand these militants have no alternative to war for their economic needs, they have to fight to earn and to live. Poverty is one of the main causes of militancy in Afghanistan, without covering this element and without providing good economic opportunities peace deal is a dream. The peace deal of the main three parties i.e. Taliban, USA and Afghan groups can't ensure a sustainable peace and prosperity on the afghan soil, until or unless a strategic plan for economic run parallel with peace deal. The large rural population will again move to civil war for economic needs. The people should be raised from poverty. In the absence of economic opportunities, the society will again go for instability; rate of crimes will be increase naturally.

Ethnic Complexity

Afghanistan is home of many sects other than religious ethnicity. Different linguistic and tribal groups are living and carrying hold in the state. Arms hostility is common both culturally and historically. The tribes have rivalry among them

and also have with other tribes and groups. Geography and history created a huge diversity. Tribes and ethnicity carries different relationships, all rural Afghans considered themselves as tribes. There are more than forty major ethnicities who are speaking more than fifty different languages. The tribes mainly identify own members by language speaking and cultural dressing. The tribal system decides the loyalty of a person; each person is more loyal to his tribal leader instead of a state. The fights and conflicts are on the bases of tribalism. There is no national identification of Afghans, nation has always been delicate. The largest among these groups are Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Aimaqs. More influential among all these are Pashtuns who are about 40% of the entire population. Pashtuns are the main dominant ethnic group since the mid of eighteenth century. This alignment system formats a complex afghan society.

The concept of Afghan national notion is very different than that of the west, which makes it more unique and complicated. Qawm is the main factor of identification of ethnicity in Afghanistan; Qawn is defined by few main factors, which are tribes, language, families, history, regions, genetic similarities and occupation of a specified area. Most of the time an Afghan will introduce himself as affiliate with "Zadran" tribe or a resident of the "Panjshir" valley, instead of Pashtun or Tajik. Such affiliations are the sign identifies their loyalties to a certain group. In the tradition and customs these loyalties are more valuable than the lives of the members. They will not prefer their lives over such loyalties towards tribes and groups. These relationships were very strong during the 20th century but observed at the strongest position same after the withdrawal of USSR from Afghanistan, people realized tribes and groups are more valuable and important. The Taliban raise and movement was an alliance of the religious, tribal and regional influence. The same can be observed in recent and will be the biggest challenge to Intra-afghan peace in the near future.

Tajiks are Persian-speaking second largest nontribal group of Afghanistan, who are about 30% of the whole population. Tajiks are Sunni religiously. Hazaras are at 3rd number in this list, who are almost 15%. They are living in central region of Hindu Kush known as Haarajat. They are affiliated with Shi;a school of practice. 10% of the population is Uzbek but have enough influence in the region due to warrior nature. They and Turkmen have almost the same history and nature. One more

tribe of enough importance in Afghanistan known as Turkish, Aimaq. They are migrated from Turkey and have loyalties towards Turkey, influenced by Turkish culture. Among these five groups the smallest and weakest ethnic group is Persian speaking, who are more decent and innocent tribe (Hanley, 2011).

ETHNIC GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN

ETHNIC GROUPS	CONGRESS LIBRARY COUNTRY STUDY.
PASHTUN	42%
TAJIK	27%
HAZARA	9%
UZBEK	9%
AIMAK	4%
TURKMEN	3%
BALUCH	2%
OTHERS (PASHAI, NURISTANI, ARAB, BRAHUI, PAMIRI, GUJJAR, ETC.)	4%

(DIVISION, 2015).

Regional Complexity

The main reason behind the Afghanistan instability is the interest conflict of regional and global powers and that is the reality that there is excessive funding by the power for continuous the violent and extremist activities. Post Soviet Union collapse era, Pakistan found an occasion to fill the power space. Structure on its support for the Mujahidin confrontation movement during the period of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan wanted more actively to chase its objective of creating an Islamic bloc from Pakistan through Afghanistan to Central Asia, in order to establish strategic depth against India. Pakistan therefore installed pro

Pakistan, sympathetic regime in Kabul and to woo the Central Asian Republics. The Tajikistan government is particularly sensitized for any support that the Taliban might give to Islamic radicals within its own borders, having emerged in May 1997 from a civil war in which the remnants of the former Soviet regime were pitted against Islamic rebels from the mountains of Gorno-Badakshan.

Uzbekistan is worried and feels fear of both of Tajikistan and Russia. For the reason in the beginning, the Uzbek government show willingness to join in the collective security arrangements sort out by some members of the CIS after the collapse of the Soviet Union but, more recently, particularly with the advent of President Putin, it had distanced itself from Moscow and to reach some kind of arrangements and reconciliation with the Taliban.

However the states of Turkmenistan choose a neutral position and decided to not join any block or collective security arrangements from the invasion of USSR to the collapsing of USSR. They always remain on a side, although they established good diplomatic relations with Taliban.

The USSR invasion was a threat for Iran, which was of a sign of weaken position and hold of Iran on the Shi'a community and school of thought in Afghan population. That's why Iran preferred to provide economic and strategic support to different militant groups of Shi'a school of believe in the Hazarajat, mainly to those groups who were ideologically loyal to the state of Iran. Those militants were emotionally attached to Iranian revolution. Hisb-e-Wahdat was an umbrella militant group encouraged by Iran to form a stable government in central Afghanistan in 1990, on the same format of Iran revolution. This was clear involvement of Iran in the affairs of internal matters of Afghanistan.

Saudi Arabia has been one of the more low-profile of Afghanistan's neighbors in recent years but has nonetheless had a major impact on events by funding for establishment and development of Islamic madrasahs in the 1980s and by lending financial support to the Mujahidin until 1991. The open support given to Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War by certain Mujahidin parties, and their denunciation of US military involvement in the Gulf and Saudi support for it, caused the Saudis to withdraw their support. However, their decision at this point to divert their

financial assistance to parties such as Jamiat al-Ulema al-Islami in Pakistan has undoubtedly strengthened the power base of the Taliban. More recently, following the US air strikes of August 1998 and the defiant assertion by the Taliban that they would continue to provide hospitality to the Saudi, Osama bin Laden, who was actively campaigning for the USA to withdraw its forces from the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia discontinued its support. It also lowered its level of diplomatic representation, having been one of only three countries, along with Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, which extended diplomatic recognition to the Taliban regime when they first captured Mazar in May 1997. On the other hand, USA and China are struggling to have enough influence in Afghanistan. Russia is also hopeful to get back Communist Regime in the state. The biggest player in the play is India, who is putting all his efforts to counter Pakistan's influence.

All these situations and trend of the past is making the peace deal as a dream. United State is withdrawing on the same manner of USSR. The regional powers and neighbor states are on the ground with the same manner of 1989. These powers will try to achieve their interest at any cost; obviously all of them have enough influence in the state. This tug of power is making Intra-Afghan Peace deal more complicated and ambiguous.

Religious Complexity

Achieving a durable peace also relies on Afghanistan's peoples and armed groups reaching an accommodation. It is here that Peter Marsden's Report makes its most significant contribution. He explains the political, social, religious and ethnic factors behind the country's recent history, debunking in the process some of the simplistic and stereotyped views so prevalent abroad. The systematic denial of women's rights, generally associated with the Taliban's interpretation of Islam, is in fact a much deeper phenomenon in Afghan society, most closely associated with the Pushtun tribe. At the same time, political killings and torture practiced by those in power, often against members of ethnic and religious minority groups, are largely unreported.

So too is the manner in which the conflict has become in some respects ethicized – again partly through foreign influences – as demonstrated most horrifically in the

waves of killings carried out by the Northern Alliance and Taliban forces, in turn, following the abortive Taliban attempt on Mazar-i-Sharif in May 1997 and their successful conquest of the city in August 1998 (Marsden, November 2001).

The Sunni population, comprising the Baluchis, Pushtuns, Tajiks, Turkomans and Uzbeks, for the most part, all adhere to the Hanafi School while the Shi'as are divided between the Imami Shi'as (part of the Hazara population, together with the Farsiwan and the Qizilbash) and the Ismaili Shi'as (part of the Hazara and Tajik populations, together with several thousand people living in the Pamirs, the high peaks of Badakshan). There used to be a strong Sufi, or mystic, tradition in Afghanistan which, in later years, was very much linked to two traditionalist Mujahidin leaders, Pir Gailani and Sibghatullah Mujadidi. Sufism was not tolerated by the Taliban and it is likely that, with the departure into exile of these two men, its practice has largely died out. In addition to the Muslim population, about 20,000 Hindus and 10,000 Sikhs have worked in the cities of Afghanistan as traders, merchants and moneylenders. They have also had a major role in the money market. The intensity of the conflict in Kabul, from 1992 to 1996, led a majority of the Hindus and Sikhs to leave the country, primarily for India, or to move to relatively safe areas such as Jalalabad.

The Hindu and Sikh populations have been able to practice their respective religious beliefs, rituals and festivals without any official constraints. However, the arbitrary nature of rule since 1992 has often acted as a de facto constraint because of the climate of fear. The Taliban twice announced that they would require Sikhs and Hindus to wear yellow pieces of cloth to enable the religious police to differentiate them from Muslims and so not enforce the behavioral codes imposed on the Muslim population. Afghanistan's two decades of conflict have been sustained by the sponsorship of other states, including Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union/Russian Federation and the USA. A formula to end the conflict will require not only the agreement of the Afghan parties but also clear commitments from these other states to enable the Afghan people to decide their own future, with at the same time the support of the international community to help rebuild the country. The UN process centered on the Six plus Two Group therefore still offers the most promising vehicle for the negotiation of a wider political settlement in the wake of the US-led military action.

The religious dilemma is the most dangerous obstacle on the way of peace too Afghanistan. The religious belief system will hit the peace process with more power. The affiliations of religious groups with neighbor states like Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia will confuse the peace deal especially the Intra-Afghan peace deal more.

Recommendations

To achieve the dream of a peaceful Afghanistan, some recommendation can be drawn from the research work.

The US have to force Taliban to negotiate with Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah. Both the political leaders have enough influence and large number of followers in the state, without their involvement the dream for a sustainable peace and stability has no physical existence. On the other hand Taliban also have to respond positively and maturely towards Intra-Afghan peace deal. Intra-Afghan peace is much complicated than the peace deal with US. The biggest challenge for Taliban is to bring all the interior groups on a single page.

All the stakeholders have to accept each other. Taliban have to accept the democratic government as representative of public and Kabul has to accept Taliban as the main party for negotiation. Without accepting each other the peace deal is of no value. The anarchy still exists. Being a major group Taliban need to bring all the Ethnic, regional and religious groups to table for peace deal. The tribal leadership should be in unity for durable peace on the soil. The absence of few groups or leaders can push the state into civil wars again in the same pattern of 1989 and 1992.

Each and every group and tribe have some external relations i-e Taliban are more affiliated with Pakistan, Sunni have religious ties with Saudi, Shia are more loyal towards Iran, democratic government are in economic ties with India and some tribes are respecting Turkey and central Asia. In Intra-afghan peace deal all the groups have to ignore their foreign, personal, religious and political affiliations and have to think about the future of own state and nation. Taliban are more interested in Islamic radical system while Kabul is looking forward towards

democracy. Tribes are interested in Pashtun Tribalism format of state affairs. A moderate system should be adopted for the state affairs and selection of Government and representatives, acceptable to each group and party. The only way to format a national level Loya Jirga, which have representatives from each group and tribe to decide a system for future to run the state affairs.

In Afghanistan each and every leader is trying for own and its group interest. Preferences should be given to the choices of public instead of personalities. A plebiscite is a positive option to measure the choices of common public. Through the choices of public the state can easily achieve the main objectives of a state like prosperity and stability. Pashtuns are about 42% of the entire population. They respect the tribal system and Loya Jirga more than the religious teachings. There is a famous quote in Pashto that “we are Pashtun from 5000 years and we are Muslims from 1400 years”. The other ethnic groups are also affiliated with tribal system. The most effective way to bring peace and stability is the tribal diplomacy of “Jirga” and “Pakhtunwali.”

The biggest issue with this region is the multi diversity of tribes, ethnic groups and religious sects. The leaders are more loyal to their affiliations instead of states. Same is the issue with Afghanistan. Unity of all groups and honesty of the leaders is the only way to bring Afghanistan on the roads of peace and prosperity. All the Groups have to compromise up to some extent on their ideologies. Without compromising and bowing heads in front of each other the peace and prosperity is not possible. Afghan has to be Conscientious practical human being, whose initiative, should be dictated by the demands of circumstances and not by ideologies and school of thoughts.

Conclusion

The US made a mistake they signed a deal in which it was finalized that Taliban will not attack on US forces but no such promise made that Taliban will not threaten Afghan security forces, that’s why the violence is still observing. From the statements of Taliban leaders it is clear that they are planning to fight Kabul after US withdraw for ultimate power. A single mistake will provide way to big losses and destructions. Afghanistan is an international industry, from where everyone is earning; stake holders invested in drug business are not in favor of complete peace.

Peace is possible but will be more effective if Afghans choose the traditional ways of “Pakhtunwali” instead of modern diplomacy. Power sharing, disarming of militants, integrating of militants, system through which the state will be governed and amendments in the constitution are not simple problems. The role of neighbor states is very important to decide the future of Afghanistan. Unity and sincerity are the only tools to dissolve the problem. Taliban are ready now to counter the internal rivals. The history is going to repeat itself on the pattern of USSR disintegration. Recently in a leaked phone call of “Mula Barader” appealed the public to help them in establishing an Islamic state, he said to the supporters of USA that they are leaving you helpless, now there is only one option with you people to unarm to Taliban. This phone call is the indicator that Taliban are planning for further armful actions. In reaction of such actions other Militant, Ethnic and democratic forces will respond and the state of Afghanistan will again go towards instability and lawlessness. No one is ready to compromise on ideological and political affiliations. In such circumstances every group and leader will obviously try to achieve more power, money and position, Civil War looms in Afghanistan.

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